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"We must build a United States of Europe." Winston Churchill'
J.D. candidate, May 2006, University of Houston Law Center; B.A., Trinity University, 2002.
1want to thank Professor Zamora for all of his encouragement.
1.

Winston Churchill, Speech at Zurich University (Sept. 1946); See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL.,
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I. INTRODUCTION

After the dust settled from World War II, Winston Churchill declared the
need for Europe to integrate economically and politically. Integration promised
not only peace, but the means by which Europe could remain a world power.
The European Union (EU) is considered by many the answer to Europe's postwar condition.2 The creation of a common market in 1992, a single monetary
unit in 1999, and the latest induction of Eastern European countries in 2004
demonstrate the success of the EU.3 With the impending ratification of the
Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, 4 it is clear that the European
Union has evolved from a mere free trade agreement5 to an economic and
political union.' Fundamental to the formation of an integrated Europe has been
the creation of a common legal system.'
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 4 (West Group 2d ed. 2002) (1993) (giving context to
Churchill's speech); See also JOHN CHARMLEY, CHURCHILL'S GRAND ALLIANCE 248 (1995).

2.

A Divided Union, ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 2004, at 14 [hereinafter "A Divided Union"].

3.

JOHN VAN OUDENAREN, UNITING EUROPE: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE EUROPEAN UNION I I

(Rowman & Littlefield, Inc. 2d ed. 20

05) [hereinafter UNITING EUROPE]; see generally BERMANN, supra

note 1 ; The EU at a Glance,
http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/index-en.htm (last visited Feb. 13, 2005)
("[The EU] has helped to raise living standards, built a single Europe-wide market, launched the single
European currency, the euro, and strengthened Europe's voice in the world.").

4.
See generally Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe, Dec. 16, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310)
1; see also A Divided Union, supranote 2, at 10.
5.
The seeds of the EU were planted in 1952 with the creation of the European Coal and Steel
Treaty (ECSC). BERMANN, supra note 1, at 5. France, Germany, Italy, and the three Benelux countries
designed the ECSC Treaty to ensure that Germany would not develop a supply of weapons. Id
6.
See Reinhard Zimmermann, The "Europeanization" of Private Law Within the European
Community and the Reemergence ofa EuropeanLegal Science, I COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 73 (1995) (referring
to the movement towards integration with the passage of the Single European Act, the Maastrich Treaty, and
stating "[o]bviously, therefore, the political will exists to advance the process of European integration on an
economic, political, and cultural level; and it appears to be perfectly appropriate to facilitate this process by
striving towards legal unity."); see also CATHERINE BARNARD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EU: THE FOUR
FREEDOMS, 6 (2004) ("The history of the EU lends support for neo-functionalism as an explanation for the
integration process - in less than fifty years the EU has moved from being merely a coal and steel community
to now a major economic and monetary union.").

7.
See Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal
Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 121 (2001) ("The
feasibility of a coherent European economic system inevitably depends on a coherent European legal order,"
quoting Eric Stein, Assimilationof NationalLaws as a Function of EuropeanIntegration,58 AM. J. INT'L L.
1, 29 (1964)); see also George Tridimas & Takis Tridimas, National Courts and the European Court of
Justice: A Public Choice Analysis of the PreliminaryReference Procedure,24 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 125,
127 (2004) ("Uniform interpretation of law reduces distortions of competition and promotes economic
efficiency");
Historical experience has demonstrated that a common market or free trade area cannot
operate smoothly without certain generally recognized rules and procedures, without
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The task of unifying European nations with different languages, legal
systems, and sordid pasts represents a significant hurdle to achieving harmonization of laws. 8 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) through Article 234 (ex
Article 177) of the Treaty of Rome," the preliminary ruling procedure, has been
the main facilitator in the legal integration of Europe. l° Although grounded in
the civil tradition, the ECJ's interpretation of Article 234 bestows its decisions
with the power of precedents. Thus, by borrowing from the common law
tradition, the ECJ has created a system of integration by adjudication. This
comment seeks to illustrate the evolution of the European legal system as a part
of the evolution of the European Union, and the ECJ's key role in the
harmonization of laws via Article 234.
Part II provides a background on the ECJ. Part III introduces Article 234
and explains how the preliminary ruling system functions. Part IV analyzes the
ECJ's expansion ofjurisdiction by giving its decisions the power of precedent
through Article 234. Part V addresses how Member States allowed for this
expansion of power. Part VI concludes by discussing the evolution and
harmonization of the European legal system as part of globalization.

a core of common legal institutions and convictions .... Legal unification has also
always been both stimulus for and consequence of political unification, and as a
cultural phenomenon it serves to strengthen the feeling of provincial, national or
supranational identity.
Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 73; Geoffrey Garret, R. Daniel Kelemen & Heiner Schulz, The European Court
ofJustice,National Governments, andLegal Integrationin the European Union, 52 INT'L ORG. 149 (1998).
8.
See UNrrING EUROPE, supra note 3, at 15 (stating that "the EU of today has twenty-five members
and twenty official languages using two alphabets, the Greek and Roman. Economically, culturally, and
socially it is far more diverse than the Carolingian Europe of 1957."); see also Curran, supra note 7, at 121.
("Scratching the surface of the European Union's legal system might bring into view a juridical Tower of
Babel, due to the clash of discordant legal cultures between the two principal, divergent legal systems
coexisting in the European Union: namely, the common-law and civil-law systems."); see also Zimmermann,
supra note 6, at 65 (noting that "for the past two hundred years or so there have been, in principle, as many
legal systems (and, consequently, legal sciences) in Europe as there are nation states.").
9.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7 1992, U.J. (C224) 1 (1992), [1992] 3
C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].
10. Francis G. Jacobs, Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-Fertilizationof Legal Systems: The
European Courtof Justice, 38 TEx. INT'L L.J. 547, 550 (2003) ("It is probably true to say that, over the first
thirty years of the EEC, the case law of the ECJ made a more significant contribution to European integration
than any other development over that period."); see also Matthew T. King, Comment, Towards a Practical
Convergence: The Dynamic Uses ofJudicialAdvice in UnitedStatesFederalCourts andthe Courtof Justice
ofthe European Communities, 63 U. PrrT. L. REV. 703, 723 (2002) ("Article 234 (then 177) 'is essential for
the preservation of the community character of the law established by the treaty and has the object of ensuring
that in all circumstances this law is the same in all states of the Community,"' quoting the ECJ's opinion in
Case 166/73, Rheinmuhlen-Dusseldorf v. Einfuhr, 1974 E.C.R. 33)).
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II. THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
The Treaty of Rome created the ECJ in 1957 to resolve disputes
concerning the European Community (EC) Treaties and assist national courts
in the uniform application and interpretation of EU laws." The ECJ is charged
with the duty of interpreting treaties and making sure that Member States
comply with EU law.' 2 "The over arching obligation of the ECJ is, in this view,
to pursue the primary objective of the EC Treaty as set forth in the Preamble:
'an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.'"13
The ECJ holds four powers:
1)

judicial review;

2)
3)

answering preliminary questions under Article 234;
answering administrative questions regarding EU personnel;
and
14
reviewing decisions of the Court of First Instance (CFI).

4)

This discussion focuses on the second power, the preliminary ruling procedure
under Article 234, which represents the majority of the ECJ's work. 5
While it might seem natural to draw an analogy that the ECJ is to the EU
what the Supreme Court is to the United States, "the Treaty of Rome did not
provide for the establishment of a Supreme Court.' 6 Unlike the United States
Supreme Court, which hears appeals from lower courts, the ECJ does not hear
appeals from lower courts because there are no lower courts, with the exception

11.

Kevin Andrew Swartz, Note, Powerful, Unique, and Anonymous: The European Court of

Justice and Its ContinuingImpact on the Formationof the European Community, 3 S.CAL. INTERDISC. L.J.

687, 691 (1994).
12.
See BERMANN, supra note 1, at 58 ("Article 220 (ex 164) of the EC Treaty gives the Court the
responsibility for 'ensur[ing] that the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is observed."').
13.

Peter

L.

Lindseth,

Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of

Supranationalism: The Example of the EuropeanCommunity, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 628, 701 (1999) (quoting
preamble of EEC Treaty: "The internal market is the cornerstone of that 'ever closer union,' and together
they constitute the very purpose-the 'telos'-of the EC.").
14.

See generallyBERMANN, supranote 1, at 58-71 (giving a detailed account of the ECJ facts, such

as terms ofjudges, the composition of the court, and the Court of First Instance (CFI)). The CFI was created
in 1988 to deal with the overload in the ECJ's docket). Id. at 65. It primarily hears cases dealing with private

litigants, whereas the ECJ handles cases between Member States and EU institutions. Id.at 66. See also
Justice Breyer, Constitutionalism, Privatization, and Globalization: Changing Relationships Among
EuropeanConstitutionalCourts, 21 CARDozo L. REV.1045, 1049-1051 (2000) (giving a simple explanation
and background to the ECJ and how it works).
15.

Breyer, supra note 14, at 1049; see also BERMANN supra note 1, at 352 (noting that referrals

compose about half of the ECJ's case docket).
16.

Tridimas, supra note 7.
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of the CFI. 7 "This is hardly surprising since the Community was not born as
a federation but rather as a sui generic supranational entity with an open-ended
integrative potential."' 8
Because the other EC institutions exercise powers of execution and
legislation to enforce the Treaty of Rome, it was "imperative that there should
be some mechanism to ensure the uniform application of Community law
throughout the Member States."' 9 The possibility of national courts rendering
different interpretations of the EC Treaties impedes the goal of economic and
legal harmonization.2 ° The only way for the EU to overcome 150 years of
different constitutions and civil codes was to give the ECJ the power to overrule
the national courts and establish a precedent that national courts would be
obliged to follow.2 "That is, the EC relied on its adjudicative authority to give
content, on a case-by-case basis, to the common market norms set forth in the
Treaty., 22 Through Article 234's preliminary ruling procedure, the ECJ was
given "unifying jurisdiction. '23

m.

ARTICLE 234

A. GeneralDescription
Article 234 provides:
1)

2)

3)

The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary
rulings concerning:
a) the interpretation of the Treaty;
b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of
the Community and of the ECB;
c) The interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by
an act of the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where such a question is raised before any court or tribunal of
a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that
a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give
judgment, request the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a
court or tribunal of a Member State, against whose decision

17.
See BERMANN supranote 1, at 65-70 (addressing the creation of the CFI to deal with the ECJ's
overloaded docket).
18.

Tridimas, supra note 7.

19.

Id.

20.

See id.

21.

Id.

22.

Lindseth, supra note 13, at 662-63.

23.

Tridimas, supra note 7.
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there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court of Justice.24
Article 234 is a procedural device that "enables the ECJ, on request of

national courts, to provide rulings on the interpretation and validity of Community law."2 A preliminary ruling occurs when a national judge is confronted
with a question demanding the application of EU law that is unclear.26 Once the
ECJ answers the question, the national court is bound by the ECJ's

interpretation and "must apply the Court's ruling to the facts of the case."27
Theoretically, the ECJ's ruling is only binding on the parties and the court

that submitted the question.2" However, in practice, the ECJ's pronouncements
"are cast in general terms and have been held by the Court to apply to future
cases." 2 9 As one scholar notes:
[D]espite the absence of a formal rule of stare decisis binding the
Court of Justice itself, Article 234 rulings constitute binding precedents for national courts in later cases. Like other Court of Justice
rulings, they allow Community law to acquire a determined meaning
throughout the territory of the Community, and thus promote legal
certainty and unity. °

Article 234 is easily considered the "most important procedural rule of the
Treaty"' because it not only "facilitates dialogue between national courts and
the ECJ, 3 2 but also "provides a meeting point between Community and national
law. '33

24.

EEC Treaty, supra note 9, at art. 234.

25.

Tridimas, supranote 7.

26.

BERMANN, supra note

27.

Swartz, supra note 11, at 692-93.

1,at 354,

28.
Case 52/76, Benedetti v. Munari, 1977 E.C.R. 163; Case 29/68, Milch-, Fett- und Eierkontor
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Saarbrcken, 1969 E.C.R. 165.
29.
BERMANN, supra note 1, at 354; see also Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa v. Nederlandse
Belasting-sadministratie, 1963 E.C.R. 61 (discussing the Da Costa ruling by the ECJ, which in effect initiated
a system of precedent infra note 51).
30.

Id.

31.
Tridimas, supra note 7; see also Martin Shapiro, The European Court of Justice, in THE
EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 323 (1999) [hereinafter EVOLUTION OF EU LAW] (stating that Article 234 is
considered the "crown jewel" of the ECJ's jurisdiction); Paul Craig, The Jurisdictionof Community Courts
Reconsidered,36 TEx. INT'L L.J. 555, 559 (2001) (describing "the ECJ's jurisdiction over preliminary rulings
under Article 234 ... is regarded as the jewel in the Crown of the existing regime.").
32.

Tridirnas, supra note 7.

33.

Id.at 127-28.
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B. How Article 234 Functions

A national court makes the initial determination of whether a question of
Community law is pertinent to the case.34 "The national court must consider
whether or not the answer to the EU law question is necessary to formulate a

decision in the case before it makes a discretionary referral under Article
234(2)."" Once the national court submits a question to the ECJ, regardless if
the question is mandatory or not, the ruling is binding on the referring parties

and court. 6
According to Article 234, national courts may ask for a preliminary ruling

in only two circumstances: "1) a discretionary reference under Article 234(2);
and 2) a compulsory reference under Article 234(3)."" The following
discussion addresses the differences between these two scenarios.
A mandatory referral occurs when a question of EU law is presented and

no judicial remedy exists under national law. 38 The only exceptions are: "1) the
issue is irrelevant; 2) the Court has already addressed the question; or 3) the

correct application of EC law is obvious. 39 Mandatory referrals may come
from lower national courts when no judicial remedy exists.4 °
Under an Article 234 preliminary ruling, the ECJ's role is simply to clarify

the meaning of EU law and leave it to the national court to apply the law to the
case at hand. 4' Although the ECJ is to limit its analysis to EC law, the ECJ

typically makes it clear how the national court should rule. 42 The decision made

34.
See Lisa Borgfeld White, Comment, The Enforcement of European Union Law: The Role of
the European CourtofJustice and the Court'sLatest Challenge,18 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 833, 847 (1996) (noting
that "[t]he ECJ 'will refuse to accept a reference where it considers that the procedure is being abused by
artificially contrived proceedings designed for the purpose of having Community law points decided").
35.
See id (explaining that "[t]he ECJ wants the national court to consider the following when
deciding whether to make a discretionary referral to the ECJ: '(i) establish the facts first; (ii) define the
national law context of the Community law question; and (iii) explain the reasons why the question needs to
be answered."').
36.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 127-28.

37.

White, supra note 34, at 846.

38.

Id.at 847 (citing Article 234(3)).

39.

Id.

40.

Id. at 848.

41.

Id. at 846.

42.

John P. Fitzpatrick, The Future ofthe North American Free Trade Agreement: A Comparative

Analysis of the Role of Regional Economic Institutionsandthe Harmonizationof Law in North America and
Western Europe, 19 HOUS. J. INT'L L. 1 (1996); see also Lindseth, supra note 13, at 663 (stating that "[d]espite
the fact that national courts retained ultimate decisional power in a formal sense, often ECJ interpretations
under the preliminary reference procedure effectively mandated a particular decision significantly constraining
the effect of the Member State law in question.").
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by the ECJ on the referred question is binding on the court and parties who
made the reference. 3
While in theory this ruling is applicable only to the case at hand, "when an
issue has been previously decided by a preliminary ruling in a similar case, the
earlier ECJ decision has a legal effect. '"4 Thus, if parties A v. B have a question
answered via preliminary ruling, that ruling will apply to parties C v. D if they
have the same or similar question.45 Consequently, national courts will research
ECJ jurisprudence before submitting a preliminary reference question to the
ECJ. 6 If they find a ruling on a same or similar question, they will apply the
principle laid out in the ECJ decision and cite the decision as precedent.4 7
Section D, infra, discusses the ECJ case law which developed a precedent based
legal system.
For many European civil countries, the practice of citing previous decisions as precedent is in itself a new precedent.48 Only on very rare occasions
does a French national court cite a previous decision to answer a question posed
by a set of new parties, let alone citing the decision of another court. 49 The
practice of national courts citing ECJ rulings as precedent is a revolutionary
concept.5
The result of citing precedent is the creation of a body of
jurisprudence that has "independent supranational meaning, even on issues
raised before national tribunal."'"
C. Purpose behindArticle 234
Article 234 Preliminary Ruling procedure "is the cornerstone of the
structure designed to secure a common meaningfor Community law in all the
Member States. -52 Article 234 performs three important functions: "[f]irst, it

43.

Tridimas, supranote 7 and accompanying text.

44. Fitzpatrick, supra note 42; see also BERMANN, supra note 1,at 354 (stating "though preliminary
rulings only answer the questions put by a national court in a particular case, they are cast in general terms
and have been held by the Court also to apply to future cases.").
45.
Interview with Isabel Fernhndez de laCuesta, EU Law Specialist, in Houston, Tex. (Jan. 8,
2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Fernndez de laCuesta].
46.
See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing Case 144/86, Gubisch
Maschinenfabrik KG v. Giulio Palumbo, 1987 E.C.R. 4861, which was applied by a national court in Spain).
47.
See infra notes 95-97 and accompanying text (discussing Case 144/86, Gubisch, 1987 E.C.R.
4861, applying the concept of lispendens as defined by the ECJ in a Spanish court).
48.

Interview with Fernindez de laCuesta, supra note 45.

49.

Id.

50.

Id.

51.

Fitzpatrick, supranote 42 , at 1.

52.

King, supra note 10 (emphasis added).
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ensures uniform interpretation of Community Law;"" second, "it ensures the
unity of the Community legal order and the coherence of the system ofjudicial
' finally, "it facilitates access to justice:
remedies established by the Treaty;"54
it makes it clear that Community law is to be applied not only by the ECJ but
also by national courts, thus enabling citizens to enforce their Community rights
in the national jurisdictions.""
D. Case Law DevelopingArticle 234
1. Da Costa v. Nederlandse Belastingadminstratie56
"The Da Costa case, therefore, initiated what is in effect a system of
precedent. 7 In Da Costa,the ECJ was confronted with a case raising a question
that had already been answered by the ECJ in a preliminary ruling.5" Da Costa
alleged the unlawful increase of a customs duty as prohibited by Article 12 of
the EEC Treaty.59 The Commission requested that the preliminary reference be
dismissed because the question posed by Da Costa had already been decided by
a previous judgment. 60 In response, the ECJ held that a national court is able to
refer a matter to the Court, however, if the case does not raise some new factor
or argument, the existence of an earlier ruling will dispose of the case.6,
In Da Costa the ECJ made it clear that national courts could and should
rely on previous decisions by the ECJ as a form of precedent. 62 This implies
that under the preliminary ruling system, "the ECJ directly influences national
law through opinions delivered in the context of private disputes before national
53.
Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128; see also King, supra note 10 (stating "Legal harmony is the
primary benefit, and goal, of having all Member States refer Community issues to the ECJ."); Laurence R.
Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towarda Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107 YALE L.J.
273, 291 (1997) (noting that "[tihe ostensible purpose of this provision was to ensure uniformity of
interpretation of the treaty by ensuring that six (now [nineteen]) sets of national judges did not develop

divergent interpretations of the treaty and Community secondary legislation.").
54.
Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128; see also Vladimir Shifin, Article 177 References to the
European Court, 27 DENY. J.INT'L L. & POL'Y 657, 658 (recognizing that the "uniform interpretation of

Community law is necessary for uniform application of Community law.').
55.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128.

56.

Joined Cases 28-30/62,

57.

Da Costa, 1963 E.C.R. 61.

Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, EU Law:
[hereinafter Craig & De Burca, EU Law].

Text, Cases, and Materials 440 (3d ed. 2003)

58.

Joined Cases 28-30/62, Da Costa, 1963 E.C.R. 61.

59.

Id.

60.

Id.

61.

Id.

62.

Id
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courts. 63 In addition to influencing national laws, the Court shapes and
develops Community laws via the preliminary ruling system.'
2. Srl CILFIT v. Ministry of Health

61

If Da Costa initiated the system of precedent, then CILFITv. Ministry of
Health"6 served to reinforce it.67 The CILFITdecision made it "clear that a case
can be relied on even if the ruling did not emerge from the same type of
proceedings, and even though the questions at issue were not strictly
identical."" In CILFIT,a textile firm claimed that the obligation to pay certain
Italian duties violated an EU regulation.69 The Ministry of Health urged the
Italian national court not to submit a question to the ECJ because they claimed
the matter "was so obvious as to obviate the need for a reference."70 However,
because no judicial remedy existed under the Italian Court, the question became
a mandatory referral under Article 234(3). 71 The Italian Court requested a
preliminary ruling on the matter.72
The ECJ responded by addressing the issue of an acte clai7 and "gave
guidance on the relevance of its prior decisions. 7 4 In relevant part, the ECJ
ruled that "where previous Decisions of the Court have already dealt with the
point of law in question, irrespective of the nature of the proceedings which led
to those Decisions, [and] even though the questions at issue are not strictly
identical,"75 national courts may rely on those decisions.76

63.

Fitzpatrick, supra note 42.

64.

BERMANN, supra note 1, at 352.

65.

Case 283/81 Srl CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA v. Ministry ofHealth, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.

66.

Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.

67.
Id. See also CRAIG & DE BIrRCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450 (stating that "[t]he decision
in CILFIT to reinforce precedent was surely not unintentional." Case 283/81, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.).
68.

Id. at 442.

69.

Case 283/81, Srl CILFIT & Lannificio di GavardoSpA, 1982 E.C.R. 3415.

70.

Id.

71.

Id.

72.
Id
73.
See generally CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supranote 57, at451 (describing the basic concept
of the acte clair as a doctrine created by national courts which states that ifa question of EU law is clear they
are not required to submit that question to the ECJ); see also id. at 448 (discussing the acceptance of doctrine
of the acte clairas part of the "give and take"' between national courts and the ECJ... by "the ECJ accepting
the acte clair doctrine, but placing significant constraints on its exercise" it "hope[d] that national courts
would play the game and only refuse when matters really were unequivocally clear.").
74.

Id. at 441.

75.

Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA, E.C.R. 3415.

76.

Id.
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However, according to Article 234, preliminary rulings are only to bind the
parties and court that present the question."

While the ECJ did not

affirmatively state that previous decisions are binding on future parties in a strict
sense, it basically said, "[w]e, the ECJ are not going to change our mind on the

interpretation of EU law, so if you, national court, do not have a new question,
we are going to give you the same answer as before.""8 The CILFIT decision

reinforced the notion of a uniform interpretation of EU case law.
In CILFIT,the ECJ expanded its authority under the Treaty of Rome, ex
post,by directing national courts to treat their previous decisions as precedent."9
By making its previous decisions binding on national courts, the ECJ is
effectively rewriting the Treaty and explicitly giving its decisions the power of
precedent.80

IV. How THE ECJ GREW POWERFUL VIA ARTICLE 234
A. Overview
The shifting of supremacy in the ECJ legal system flourished with ECJ's

interpretation of Article 234."1 Through the ECJ's reading and application of
Article 234, the ECJ expanded its own power by promoting a stare decisis-like
application of its rulings and strengthened the EU institutions by interpreting
EU treaties beyond their originally intended scope. 2 This expansion of power
77.
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text (outlining the limits of Article 234 preliminary
ruling under the EEC Treaty); see also CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450 (noting that
"[t]hose rulings were now to have authority for situations where the point of law was the same, even though
the questions posed in earlier cases were different, and even though the proceedings in which the issue
originally arose differed.").
78.

Interview with Fernndez de laCuesta, supra note 45.

79. See CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAw, supra note 57, at 450 (noting that "by expanding the
precedential impact of past decisions, the ECJ thereby increased the authoritative scope of its past rulings.").
80.

Id.

81.

EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, supra note 31, at 330.

82.

See Lindseth, supranote 13, at 635.
Although purportedly an entity possessing only enumerated powers, the scope of the
Community's normative authority has steadily increased since its inception in the
1950s, partly due to explicit transfers from the Member States, but more importantly
due to an expansive interpretation of Community competences by the Community
institutions themselves, notably the European Court of Justice (ECJ).
Id See also lann Margalit Maazel, Mulloche v. Netherlands: A MarshallianDiscourseon Modern Europe,
35 UWLA L. REV. 1, 25 (2003) (stating that "given the power to define the Community's sphere of
competence, the ECJ has as yet under our analysis no historical, structural, or textual basis to interpret this
sphere broadly."); Aashit Shah, The "Abuse of Dominant Position" Under Article 82 of the Treaty of
European Community: Impact on LicensingofIntellectualPropertyRights, 3 CFI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 41,
71 (2003) ("The ECJ has often been criticized as being activist and interpreting treaty provisions beyond its
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was necessary for the harmonization of laws in Europe and reflects the
evolution of a legal system to meet the demands of economic integration."
The ECJ accomplished this task in the following ways: 1) it transformed

an international treaty into a constitutional treaty by developing a body of
precedent; 2) it created fundamental principles ofEU law by interpreting the EU
Treaties beyond their originally intended scope; and (3) it transferred power in
three arenas: i) from the governments of the Member States to the institutions
of the Community; ii) from the executive and the legislature to the judiciary;

and iii) from higher national courts to lower national courts."
B. Transformingan InternationalTreaty into a ConstitutionalTreaty

The ECJ transformed an international treaty into a constitutional treaty by
creating precedent via Article 234's preliminary ruling system.5
Successful constitutional courts turn constitutions into constitutional
law, that is they convert a text enacted at a given historical moment
into a continuous, collective stream of case law ...in regard to the
ECJ, the reference here is not to the much-proclaimed and muchdisputed judicial conversion of the Treaties from the realm of
international law to that of constitutional law, but to the building of
a large body of ECJ law that has become self-generating.86

judicial parameters."); Joseph R. Wetzel, Note, Improving FundamentalRights Protectionin the European
Union: Resolving the Conflictand Confusion Between the Luxembourg andStrasbourgCourts,71 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2823, 2830 (2003) ("The ECJ's broad interpretations of treaty provisions, particularly EC Treaty
Article 234, suggest the Court's willingness to assert itself on the supranational stage.").
83.
See Shah, supra note 82 ("The ECJ has been at the forefront of the European integration
movement and has deepened and expanded the original Community principals to maintain the effectiveness
of EC law."); see also Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2831 (noting that "[t]he ECJ gradually has developed its
power and influence with the aim of promoting uniformity in Community law, thereby contributing to further
integration within the EC.").
84.

See infra notes 84-178 and accompanying text.

85.
See Heifer & Slaughter, supranote 53, at 292 (noting that "the ECJ's success has been such that
it has been widely credited with transforming the Treaty of Rome from an international instrument into the
'constitution' of the European Community."); see also Sally J. Kenney, The European Court of Justice
IntegratingEurope Through Law, 81 JUDICATURE 250 (1998).
Since its creation in 1952 under the Treaty of Paris to hear cases for the Coal and Steel
Community, the European Court ofJustice has transformed itself from an international
to a constitutional court, holding European Community law to be supreme and, in
many cases, directly effective in member states.
Id.
86.
See EVOLUTION OF EU LAw, supra note 31, at 326 ("The European Court of Justice's decisions
have changed an international treaty into a constitution").
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Instead of having an international instrument in which Member States
would apply at their own discretion, the ECJ's interpretation of Article 234
secured the application and harmonization of community law.87 According to
one scholar, it is ironic "that Article 234 puts the ECJ in a weaker position than
a supreme court in a federation," and yet, "the preliminary reference procedure
has proved to be the main procedural route through which the process of the
constitutionalization of the Community has taken place."88
C Integration by Adjudication
"One of the most importantdevelopments in European law today is
the emergence of a common private law within the European
Community.... Yet, legal science has barely startedto notice that the
face ofprivate law is about to befundamentally reshaped."89
Through the preliminary ruling procedure under Article 234, the ECJ has
developed a precedent based system achieving "integration by adjudication."
While no formal stare decisis system exists, "there is '[n]o doubt [that] a trend
towards recognition of Community precedents is gaining momentum."' 9 1 As
one scholar states:
The very prevalence of the European Court of Justice as a source, if
not, as many would say today, as the most important source, of legal
authority in the European Union, has created a system with an
increasingly common-law-like component of staredecisis. European
judges, like their common-law brethren, and, unlike their civil-law
brethren (at least in the latter's official role), create law, fashioning
it with each judicial decision, such that legal norms are judicially
created for future application to similar future cases.'
The development of Article 234 jurisprudence "can be seen as a historical
record of legal integration."93 The emphasis placed on ECJ preliminary rulings

87.

Id.

88.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128.

89.

Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 104 (emphasis added).

90.

Lindseth, supra note 13, at 664.

91.

Swartz, supranote 11, at 694 (quoting D. Lasok & J.W. Bridge).

92.

Curran, supranote 7, at 72.

93.

Thomas de laMare, Article 177 in Social andPoliticalContext, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAW

215 (Paul Craig & Grianne de Burca eds., 1999). Preliminary rulings "allow Community law to acquire a
determined meaning throughout the territory of the Community, and thus promote legal certainty and unity.".

Id. BERMANN, supranote 1, at 354.
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"demonstrates [a] natural evolution in supranational law, even one based on
civil law principles."
FashionRibbon Co. v. lberlandS.L. 95 represents an example of a national
court citing an ECJ decision as precedent. In that case, the Supreme Tribunal
of Spain cited the Gubisch v. Palumbo96 decision when defining the concept of
lispendens.97 The Gubisch decision occurred in 1987.98 Sixteen years later, in
a commercial dispute in Spain, the Supreme Tribunal of Spain cites Gubisch to
define the legal concept of lis pendens. The practice of national courts citing
ECJ preliminary rulings exemplifies the development of precedent and
harmonization of laws.
D. Building Blocks of the EU Legal System
Through the preliminary ruling system, the ECJ has expanded the scope of
its jurisdiction and laid the foundation of EU law.'O As former Judge Pescator
of the ECJ notes: "'[t]he decisions of the Court which have made the most
94.
Charles, H. Koch, Jr., Envisioning a Global Legal Culture, 25 MICH.J. INT'L L. 1, 52 (2003);
see also Lindseth supra note 13, at 638. Commenting that:
In the three decades following the EEC's establishment in 1957, the Member States
largely acquiesced in the Court's effort to elaborate autonomous supranational norms
through the development of such fundamental doctrines as direct effect, supremacy,
and implied powers, each of which helped to lay the legal foundation upon which
subsequent political integration could build.
Id.
95.
Tribunal Supremo, 1943/2001 (Madrid 2003) (a motion demanding exequatur of an arbitration
award pursuant to the New York Convention) [hereinafter Fashion Ribbon Co.].
96.
Case 144/86, Gubisch MaschinenfabrikKG, 1987 E.C.R. 4861. In Gubisch, an Italian citizen
was trying to enforce the validity of a contract against a German national. Id.Gubisch also filed a suit ina
German national court stating that the contract was invalid. Id. Both the German and Italian court had
different definitions of lis
pendens, which determined whether the contract was enforceable or not. Id. The
Italian court submitted to the ECJ a preliminary question on what the definition of Us pendens was under
Article 21 of the Convention. Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG, 1987 E.C.R. 4861. The ECJ
recognized that "the concept of lispendens is not the same in all the legal systems of the contracting states"
and "a common concept of lispendenscannot be arrived at by a combination of the various relevant provision
of national law." Id Instead of choosing between the Italian or German definition of lis
pendens, the ECJ
ruled that the definition of lis
pendens from now on would be the ECJ's interpretation of Article 21 of the
Brussels Convention. Id. (referring to the ECJ's definition of lis
pendens). Lis pendens "covers a case where
a party brings an action before a court in a contracting state for the recession or discharge of an international
sales contract whilst an action by the other party to enforce the same contract is pending before a court in
another contracting state." Id.
97.

Id.

98.

Case 144/86, Gubisch Maschinenfabrik KG, 1987 E.C.R. 4861.

99.
FashionRibbon Co., 1943/2001.
100. White, supra note 34, at 848 ("The ECJ has used Article 177 to develop several unique concepts
of EU law.").
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conspicuous contribution to the development of Community law have been
delivered [by the preliminary ruling].'"
The doctrine of direct effect, primacy
of Community law over national law, protection of fundamental rights, and the
principles of competition law and social law have all been developed by the
preliminary ruling system.'0 2 This analysis will focus on the doctrines of
supremacy and direct effect, which are considered the "'twin pillars of the
Community's legal system."" 3

1. Supremacy of EU Law
Unlike the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, the
European treaties contain no express rule that EU law is superior to national law
in the areas in which the EU has competence.'" However, if such a rule did not
exist how could harmonization of laws occur if "in a case of conflict, domestic
law was determinative"? 05 In Costa0 6, "the ECJ handed down a landmark
ruling which gave the laws of the EC supremacy over those of the Member
States."' 7
In Costa v. ENEL,0 8 an Italian Constitutional Court found an EC Treaty

invalid because it conflicted with subsequent Italian legislation.

The legisla-

101.

BERMANN, supranote 1, at 352; Lindseth, supranote 13, at638.

102.

BERMANN, supranote 1, at 352; Heifer & Slaughter, supranote 53, at 291-92.

103. Craig, supranote 31, at 560 ("[T]he reference procedure laid down in Article [234] must surely
be the keystone in the edifice; without it the roof would collapse and the two pillars would be left as a desolate
ruin, evocative of the temple at Cape Sounion - beautiful but not of much practical utility.").
104. See BERMANN, supra note 1, at 269 (noting that "[t]he closest approximation is EC Treaty
Article 10 (ex 5), which imposes on Member States a general obligation of loyalty to Community law... ");
see also Dieter Grimm, The European Court of Justice and National Courts: The German Constitutional
PerspectiveAfter the MaastrichtDecision, 3 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 229, 229-30 (1997). Commenting that:
The supremacy of Community law flows from the fact that the Community is a system
of attributed or enumerated competencies. The Community has no inherent legislative
or executive power; its institutions have no power to adopt an act unless they are
authorized to do so by a Treaty provision. If no there is no legal basis for a legislative
act in the EC Treaties, national law comes into. Thus, national law is superseded by
secondary Community law only the latter is compatible with the EC
Treaties-Community law not grounded in a Treaty provision is incapable of
superseding national law.
Id. at 232.
105. Grimm, supra note 105.
106.

Case 6/64, Flaminio Costa v. Ente Nazionale per I'Engeria Elettrica, 1964 E.C.R. 1-585.

107.

Swartz, supra note 11,at 695.

108.

Case 6/64, Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 1-585.

109. See Swartz, supra note 11, at 695-96 (noting that "the Italian constitutional court found that as
part of its domestic law, Italy had the power to create laws which contravened the Treaty of Rome.").
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tion permitted the Italian government to nationalize the electric company."0
According to Costa, an Italian citizen who refused to pay his electricity bill,
nationalizing the electric company violated EC competition law. "' The Italian
Court reasoned that "because the Italian Legislature had created a law which
conflicted with part of the Treaty of Rome, it was the Treaty rather than the later
Italian law which had to give way."" 2
Relying on the wording of Article 189, the ECJ ruled that the EC's treaties
were "directly applicable" to the Member States, and that the terms of the
treaties were "binding in [their] entirety" on them.' 3 As the ECJ stated in its
opinion, "[t]he executive force of Community law cannot vary from one State
to another in deference to subsequent domestic laws, without jeopardizing the
attainment of the objectives of the Treaty.

. ."'

By invoking the spirit of the

Treaty, the ECJ overruled a Member State's highest court and "established
[early on] the supremacy of EC law over national law and guaranteed its own
place as an important institutional wing of the EC.""' 5
The new EU Constitution codifies the supremacy of EU law, a legal doctrine created purely by ECJ case law." 6 Unlike civil law courts whose power
is defined and constrained by a legal code, the ECJ developed legal principles
to satisfy the demands of a supranational legal system." 7 In this regard, the
ECJ's behavior resembles a common law court and represents a significant
example of the evolution of the European legal system to meet the demands of
harmonization."'

110.

Case 6/64, Costa, 1964 E.C.R. 1-585.

111.
112.

Id.
Swartz, supranote 11, at 695-96.

113.

Id

114.

BERMANN, supra note 1, at 270.

115. Swartz, supra note 11, at 695-96; see also Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2832 (discussing the
evolution of the primacy principle in the SpA Simmenthal v. Comm 'n of the European Communities, 1979
E.C.R. 777, case which ruled "that national courts must apply Community law in its entirety and eliminate
any national laws that conflict with Community law.").
116. Roger J. Goebel, European Union Law: Overview: The European Union in Transition: The
Treaty of Nice in Effect; Enlargement in Sight; A Constitution in Doubt, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 455, 496
(2004).
117.

Id.

118.

Id.
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2. Doctrine of Direct Effect-Giving Private Litigants a Voice
The second pillar of the EU legal system is the doctrine of direct effect." 9
In its essence, the doctrine of direct effect allows Community regulations to be
self-executing, thus, creating rights for individuals in Member States without the
passage of legislation typically required to enforce rights under a Treaty. 2 ' The
doctrine of direct effect declares that "there are certain Treaty provisions that 1)
are precise enough to be directly effective, 2) are unqualified, and 3) require no
discretion in their application by the court."' 2 ' Any national law which conflicts
with any of these Treaty provisions must be set aside by Member States.122 The
Treaty provisions that are "sufficiently precise and unconditional so as to confer
legal rights upon that individual"' 23 also have direct effect on Member States
and are enforceable by individuals in their national courts. 24
In addition, the ECJ has ruled via Article 234 that if a Member State fails
to implement a directive after the allotted time period, the directive is still
directly applicable. 25 The court articulated that these "directives have direct
effects in national courts in the sense that they can be relied upon against the
state or state bodies . . . irrespective of whether the directive has been
implemented.' ' 26 This ruling in effect gave private citizens judicially
enforceable rights under EU law.
Perhaps the greatest transfer of power via the ECJ's interpretation of
Article 234 was the doctrine of direct effect, which granted individuals and
corporations the right to enforce EU law in their national courts. 27 "As in the
119. See CRAIG & DE BURcA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 258 (discussing the Van Gend en Loos
decision which initiated the doctrine of direct effect).
120. See EvOLUTION OF EU LAw, supra note 31, at 330 (declaring that "[tihe Court's great
bootstrapping operation was, of course, its case law creating 'direct effect' so that the Treaties and the
secondary laws made under them came to have the kind of 'supremacy' that occurs in federal, constitutional
states rather than in international organization operating under international law"); see also BERMANN, supra
note 1,at 271 (stating that Article 249 is the legal basis of direct effect).
121. Case 283/81, Sri CILFIT & Lannificio di Gavardo SpA, 1982 E.C.R. 3415. (noting that "[iun
order to find liability, the court must determine that I) the directive in question provides individuals with
rights, 2) these rights are identifiable in the directive itself, and 3) a causal link exits between the state's breach
and the individual injuries."). See also White, supra note 34, at 850.
122. White, supra note 34, at 848.
123.

Breyer, supra note 14, at 1050.

124.

White, supranote 34, at 848.

125.

Id.

126. Id.(quoting John Temple Lang, New Legal Effects Resultingfrom the Failureof States to Fulfill
Obligations Under European Community Law: The FrancovichJudgment, 16 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 4

(1992/1993)).
127. See Karen J. Alter, Who are the "Masters of the Treaty?": European Governments and the
European Court of Justice, 52 INT'L ORG. 121, 126 (1998) [Hereinafter Alter 1](noting that by "using the
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United States, individuals are the 'principal 'guardians' of the legal integrity of
Community law,' through the Article 234 preliminary ruling procedure. t ' 28
This right not only enhanced the validity of the EU as a recognizable
international institution, but it gave individuals a democratic voice in a system
that leaves little room for individual say.'29
As the ultimate recipients of the benefits of a common legal system, the
ECJ gained
a potent ally in the harmonization of laws by empowering private
130
litigants.
From the earliest of days of the Community, individuals have been
drawn in to the process of making the common market a reality in
their own States when the Court of Justice (quietly) developed
fundamental principles of direct effect and supremacy of Community
law. In this way the Court has created an alliance between itself and
individuals, thereby circumventing the Member States and the
Community legislator.'

3

1

direct effect and supremacy of EC law as its legal crutches, the ECJ does not itself exceed its authority by
reviewing the compatibility of national law with EU law in preliminary ruling cases."); see also Tridimas,
supra note 7, at 128 (stating that the combination of "the mechanism of preliminary references with the
doctrines of primacy and direct effect enables individuals and companies to assert Community rights in
national courts").
128. Maazel, supra note 82, at 19 (citing J.H.H. Weiler, The TransformationofEurope, 100 YALE
L.J. 2403, 2414 (1991)).
129.

See Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2834. Stating that:
Through its judgments in response to preliminary reference requests, the ECJ has
enhanced individual rights in areas where Community law affords better protection
than the national law of some Member States, such as equal pay for women. By
subjecting Member States' actions that affect fundamental rights to judicial review
under EU standards, Article 234 has become a vital tool for fundamental rights
improvement.
Id. See generally Lindseth, supra note 13, at 633-35 (describing the "Democratic Deficit" that is inherent in
national and supranational institutions); see also Breyer, supra note 14, at 1053 (commenting that many
European believe the EU suffers from a "democratic deficit").
130. See Wetzel, supra note 82, at 2834 (discussing "[tihe social legitimacy resulting from the
Court's image as a valuable ally to the individual against the Member State's national governments
substantially enhances the ECJ's ability to promote fundamental rights within the European Union."); see also
Tridimas, supranote 7, at 128 (noting that "individuals may use Community law as a 'shield', i.e. to defend
themselves from action by the national authorities which infringes Community rights, and as a 'sword', i.e.
to challenge national measures on grounds of incompatibility with Community laws."). Allowing private
litigants a voice is something that is not permitted by all free movement treaties, as evidenced by Article 2022
of North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 699.
131. BERNARD, supra note 6, at 17.
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Individual litigants with "an economic stake" in the formation
of a common
32
market were "the primary source of demand for law rulings."'
Allowing private litigants to raise claims in national courts regarding EU
law permitted the ECJ to address Member States' infringement, enlarging the33
scope of the ECJ's power and undermining Member States' sovereignty.
"[T]he preliminary reference procedure provides an opportunity for individuals
and, indeed, national courts to question governmental action. The ability of a
national government to control which cases are sent to the ECJ is thus
undermined."' 3' Instead of relying on Member States or the Commission to be
the enforcers of EU law, individuals and companies with an economic interest
in integration allowed the ECJ to address a wide breadth of legal issues
pertaining to the goal of economic harmonization. 35 "In this manner, the
system of preliminary ruling has been transformed ' 3into
a mechanism of
6
enforcing EC law and implementing legal integration.'
Francovichv. Italy' established the principle giving private litigants the
power to raise claims against a national government for failing to implement a
directive that granted individual rights under EU law. 131 It was not uncommon
for governments to resist implementation of an EU directive by either not
transposing the directive on time, executing it incorrectly, or not implementing
it at all. 3 9 Through the Francovichdecision, the ECJ demonstrated "the urgent
132.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 142.

133. Alter I, supra note 127, at 127 ("The transformation of the preliminary ruling system
significantly undermined [M]ember [S]tates' ability to control the ECJ. It allowed individuals to raise cases
in national courts that were then referred to the ECJ, undermining national governments ability to control
which cases made it to the ECJ.").
134. Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128. "[O]ffering individuals and companies the possibility of
challenging national law increases the ability of the ECJ to pursue its most preferred policies, while it
simultaneously decreases its dependence on the governments of the member states and the Commission to
raise an infringement cases.". Id. at 137.
135. See id. at 128 (stating that "[aireas of policy that were thought to be under the exclusive remit
of the Member States can now be considered, and indeed influenced, by the ECJ, bringing about a distinct loss

of national sovereignty.").
136.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 128; see also Alter l, supra note 127, at 129. Noting that:
Although the Court likes to pose modestly as "guardian of the Treaties" it is in fact an
uncontrolled authority generating law directly applicable in Common Market member
states and applying not only to EEC enterprises but also to those established outside
the Community, as long as they have business interests within it.

Id.
137.

Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.

138.

Id.

139. Melanie L Ogren, Francovichv. Italian Republic: Should Member States be directly liablefor
nonimplementationof European Union Directives?, 7 TRANSNAT'L LAw. 583, 604-05 (1994) (noting that
"although [M]ember [S]tates may have accepted the rule of law of the EEC Treaty and the holding of SpA
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need for enforcement and implementation of EU directives by [M]ember
[S]tates."' 4 °
In Francovich, the Italian State failed to implement a directive on the
protection of employees in the event of the employer's insolvency.' 4' Member
4
States were directed to set up a fund for compensating workers affected. 1
Plaintiff's employers went bankrupt, leaving plaintiff with no remedy.'43 The
Italian courts requested a preliminary ruling on the issue.'" In response, the
ECJ ruled "that governments must compensate individuals for the loss caused
to them resulting from the nonimplementation of directives, even those without
direct effect.' ' 145 Thus, the ECJ laid down the general principle that Member
States are liable for the consequences of not implementing directives which
create individual rights. '
The underpinning rationale of the Francovich decision is that by failing to
enforce individual rights recognized under EU law, EU law will be
undermined.147 "In order to meet the goals outlined in the EEC treaty, directive
compliance must be enforced if the system of the European Union that has been
created by its members is to reach its true potential.' 4' The European Union
was created by Member States to derive the benefits of economic and political
harmonization.' 49 Signatories to the EEC Treaty must recognize that they chose
Simmenthal [1979 E.C.RI 777] in practice [M]ember [S]tates fail to adhere to those rules.").
140.

Ogren, supra note 139, at 604.

141. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357; see also Christoph U. Schmid, Pattern
ofLegislative andAdjudicative Integrationof PrivateLaw, 8 COLuM. J. EuR. L. 415, 461 (2002) (discussing
the Francovich case).
142.

Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357.

143.

Id.

144.

Id.

145. Garret, supra note 7, at 168-69.
146. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357; see also White, supra note 34, at 850.
Stating that:
In deciding whether the employees should be compensated, the ECJ noted that the EEC
Treaty, now the EC Treaty, 'created its own legal system, which is integrated into the
legal systems of the Member States and which their courts are bound to apply. The
subjects of that legal system are not only the Member States, but also their nationals.'
Thus, the Treaty and community law impose obligations on individuals, member
nations, and community institutions.
Id.
147. Cases C-6/90, 9/90, Francovich, 1991 E.C.R. 1-5357. "The full effectiveness of Community
rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals
were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a
Member State can be held responsible.". Id.
148.

Ogren, supra note 139.

149.

THE EUROPEAN UNIONATAGLANCE, at http://www.europa.eu.int/abc/index-en.htm (last visited
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to surrender some of their sovereignty to derive these benefits.' ° "This
recognition implies an empowerment of the European Court of Justice in the
enforcement of the goals of the European Union."''
E. Expanding the Scope of its Jurisdiction
The key to the ECJ's increase in jurisdiction has been through treaty
amendments and an expansive reading of the EU Treaties.' 52 The ECJ handles

cases on issues of the environment, direct taxation, public policy, arbitration,
and fundamental human rights, to name a few.' 53 With more matters coming
under the ECJ's jurisdiction, its power to harmonize law is increasing. As
United States Supreme Court Justice Breyer states in reference to the
preliminary ruling system, "one might believe, or at least plausibly argue, that
EC law, as interpreted by the ECJ, slowly but surely will come to dominate
national law in many areas of European life.' 54
A prime example of the ECJ extending its jurisdiction is the Eco Swiss
China Ltd. v. Benetton InternationalNV decision which defined the notion of

public policy and redefined procedures for making an arbitration agreement
enforceable. 55

In Eco Swiss, the ECJ ruled that certain types of arbitration

Feb. 13, 2005) ("[The EU] has helped to raise living standards, built a single Europe-wide market, launched
the single European currency, the euro, and strengthened Europe's voice in the world.").
150. Id.; see Ogren, supra note 139 (discussing the benefits of belonging to the EU).
151. Ogren, supra note 139. "Without directive compliance, the EU essentially loses its gamut of
control, and unification and harmonization between member states become meaningless ideals. Francovich
v. Italian Republic is an attempt by the European Court of Justice to urge compliance with EU (d]irectives.".
Id.
at 605.
152. See BERMANN,supra note 1, at 63-65 (discussing Treaty ofNice giving the ECJ the right to rule
on issues of fndamental rights).
153.

Interview with Isabel Fermindez de laCuesta, supra note 45.

154. Breyer, supra note 14, at 1051; see also Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 104 (stating "[t]he
process of harmonization and unification of private law on a European level appears to be irreversible today;
and it is likely to gain an ever greater momentum."). The implications for international companies, especially
US corporations doing business with European countries, is an increasing demand for lawyers who understand
EU law and are familiar with the ECJ rulings; see also BERMANN, supranote i, at 3. ("As those engaged in
international transactions take increasing interest in the development of Europe-wide policies, so the
international legal community has taken a parallel interest in the workings of the relatively young but
sophisticated Community legal system.").
155. Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, 1999 E.C.R. 1-03055.
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agreements are void against public policy.'56 Accordingly, if any one of the four
freedoms is hampered, the agreement is void against public policy.'
58
Before Eco Swiss, various definitions of public policy existed in Europe.1

Each nation had a distinct definition written into their civil code.159 With the
Eco Swiss decision, the ECJ ruled that Member States could still have their
definitions of public policy, but in order to comply with EU law their definition
must at a minimum abide by the ECJ's definition of public policy. 6
The Eco Swiss decision demonstrates the ECJ's goal of the uniform
application of EU law, by requiring parties to an arbitration agreement to meet
the ECJ's definition of public policy.' 6' The implication of this decision is that
when parties are drafting arbitration agreements, they will look primarily to ECJ
jurisprudence, not the New York Convention, if they want their arbitration
agreement to stand in a European court.'62
F. Garneringthe Support of National Courts
The preliminary ruling system is dependent on national courts cooperating
by submitting questions of EU law to the ECJ. 6 3 The preliminary ruling

156. See id; see also Chistoph Liebscher, Arbitral & JudicialDecision: European PublicPolicy
After Eco Swiss, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 81, 83 (1999) (explaining that Benetton submitted a petition to the
national court asking it to annul the arbitration award on the grounds that the arbitration agreement violated
Article 85 (now article 81) since it contained a market-sharing clause.). Case C-126/97, Eco Swiss ChinaTime
Ltd, 1999 E.C.R. 1-03055. Susana S. Ha, The effects of Nullity ofArticle 81(2) EC, LUND U.: MASTER OF
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS PROGRAMME LAw, 16 (2003). "Article 81(1) and 82 [of EC Treaty] establish, in general
terms, a prohibition of practices which may distort trade between Member States" Id. at 4. If an agreement
violates Article 81, it is considered void under Article 82. Id.
157. Liebscher, supra note 156, at 83 (quoting the ECJ: "[a]rticle 81 constitutes a fundamental
provision which is essential for the tasks of the Community, and, in particular, for the functioning of the
internal market ....
void.").

[A]ny agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to that article are to be automatically

158. Interview with Anibal Sabater, Foreign Legal Consultant, Fulbright & Jaworski L.L.P., in
Houston, Tex. (Jan. 8, 2005) (on file with author) [hereinafter Interview with Anibal Sabater].
159.

Id.

160. See Ha, supra note 156, at 13 (quoting the ECJ's holding "that Article 81 EC constitutes 'a
fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment for the functioning of the internal market'
and is to be considered 'a matter of public policy."').
161. See id "The ECJ reiterates that it is manifestly in the interest of the Community legal order that
the rules of Community law are given a uniform interpretation, irrespective of the circumstances in which they
are to be applied." Id. See also Ha,supranote 156, at 14 (noting that in this ruling, the ECJ "recognized the
importance of Article 81 EC in the accomplishment of the internal market.").
162.

Interview with Anibal Sabater, supra note 158 (The New York Convention is the main treaty

on the enforceability of arbitral awards).
163.

See Tridimas, supranote 7, at 142.
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procedure begins and ends with national courts.'
Without their support, the
ECJ's power under Article 234 could not have been established.165 By national

courts submitting questions to the ECJ and then applying
the ECJ's interpreta'
tion of EU law, EU law becomes "nationalised."'
Consequently, the acceptance of preliminary rulings as precedent by
national courts "has [had important] implications for the more general relationship between national courts and the ECJ."'67 As noted by some scholars:
In so far as ECJ rulings do have precedential value, they place the
Court in a superior position to national courts. The very existence of
a system of precedent is indicative of a shift to a vertical hierarchy
between the ECJ and national courts: the ECJ will lay down the
legally authoritative interpretation, which will then be adopted by
national courts.

6
1

The transfer of power from national courts to the ECJ in essence created a
hierarchy with the ECJ at the top of that system.'69 While national courts,
especially the Supreme Courts, could have felt threatened by this transfer of

power (and many in fact were), 7 ° the empowerment of the ECJ served to
empower the judiciary of many Member States. 7 '
The ECJ transferred power from the executive and legislative branches to

the judiciary by making "national courts... [the] enforcers of Community law
in their own right."' 72 "When the ECJ has decided an issue, national courts can
then apply the ruling without further resort to the ECJ. The national courts are,

in this sense, 'enrolled' as part of a network of courts adjudicating on

164. Craig, supra note 31, at 560; see also Shifin, supra note 54. "Disputes involving Community
law never come directly before the Court of Justice, but rather before the courts and tribunals of Member
States." Id.; Tridimas, supranote 7, at 142 (stating that "demand becomes effective only when national courts
refer to the ECJ, which is the ultimate source of supply [of preliminary references].").
165. See Tridimas, supra note 7, at 134 (explaining that "In short, the co-cooperation of national
courts is a sine qua non for the success of the preliminary reference procedure .... Legal integration and the
implementation of ECJ jurisprudence has relied on the willingness of national courts to refer cases to the
Court.") (emphasis added).
166.

Craig, supranote 31, at 560.

167.

CRAIG & DE BuRcA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 442.

168.

Id.

169. Id. at 450 (stating that "the ECJ [is] at the apex of that network").
170. See infra notes 175-180 and accompanying text (discussing the empowerment of lower national
courts by Article 234).
171. See generally Karen J. Alter, Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an
International Rule of Law in Europe 34 (2001) [Hereinafter Alter II].
172.

CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450.
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Community law...,,73 Politicians who attempt to use extra legal means to
circumvent ECJ law are faced by national courts applying ECJ rulings. 74 Thus,
by reinforcing their own legitimacy, national courts bolstered the ECJ's
legitimacy. This system of precedent also serves as an "important symbolic
[function] which flows from the recognition that the national courts are part of
a real Community judicial hierarchy."' 75
While the cooperation of national judiciaries was necessary for expanding
the ECJ's preliminary ruling power, it was the enlistment of lower national
courts that solidified the ECJ's prominence. Because lower national courts are
permitted to make preliminary references under Article 234,76 lower courts
could bypass their country's Supreme Court and thereby influence policy issues
at the highest level. " This is described as "judicial empowerment."'7 8 The
rationale behind this theory is:
In a national setting without access to the supranational legal system,
the national court has few, if any chances, to see its ideal point
implemented, since the higher national authority will reverse it on
appeal or by new national legislation. When the national court is
given the option to refer the case to the ECJ and apply its ruling, the
set of interpretations that can be applied in practice changes
dramatically. 79

173.

Id.

174.

Alter I, supra note 127, at 133; see also EVOLUTION OF EU LAW, supra note 31, at 144-45

(stating that the support of national judiciaries "was critical in limiting the ability of national governments to
simply ignore unwanted legal decisions from the international ECJ"... and reiterating that "the ECJ has
changed the weak foundations of the EU legal system, with the help of national judiciaries").
175.

CRAIG&DE BURCA, EU LAW, supra note 57, at 450.

176. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text (discussing the institutions and circumstances
which permit submission of preliminary questions to the ECJ).
177.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 135.

178.

Id. (citing J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformationof Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2426 (1991)).

179.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 141-43 noting that:
The ability of national courts to influence policy is much weaker in the national context
of each [M]ember [S]tate than in the supranational context of the EC, where national
courts implement the authoritative interpretations of the law given by the ECJ. The
rulings of national courts can be overturned and altered more easily by higher national
authorities than the rulings of the ECJ can be altered by the equivalent authorities of

the EC.
Id. AccordWeiler, supranote 128, at 2426 (stating that "Lower courts and theirjudges were given the facility
to engage with the highest jurisdiction in the Community and thus have de facto judicial review of
legislation.").
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Article 234 served to empower lower national courts, securing the cooperation
of national courts in the application and "the very development of the
Community legal order."'"8
V. MEMBER STATES REACTION
A. Background

"It is fair to say that when the Member States opted for an ECJ, they
thought that Luxembourg would be far closer to the Hague than the District of

Columbia."' 8' Historically, the ECJ was created to deal only with the review of
EU law, not the interpretation of national laws.'82 Member States intended to

create a court with limited jurisdiction to protect their national sovereignty.'83
However, through Article 234 the ECJ "transformed the preliminary ruling
system from a mechanism to allow individuals to question EC law into a
mechanism to allow individuals to question national law."'' As one scholar
states, "[t]he accretion of power by the European Court of Justice is arguably

the clearest manifestation of the transfer of sovereignty from nation-states to a
supranational institution, not only in the European Union but also in modem
international politics more generally."'8 5 Despite this dramatic shift in power,
Member States and their national courts "have bowed to the ECJ's
requirements, and have accepted the Court's jurisprudence. '
How is it then that Member States, which created the ECJ, allowed the
Court to expand its jurisdiction beyond its originally intended reach?' 87 As
180.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 134.

181.

EVOLUMTON OF EU LAw, supranote 31, at 331 (emphasis added).

182. Alter I, supranote 127, at 125 (stating "Article 177 challenges were to pertain only to questions
of European law, not to the interpretation of national law or to the compatibility of national law with EC
law."). See id. also noting:
The ECJ was created to fill three limited roles for the [M]ember [S]tates: ensuring that
the Commission and the Council of Ministers did not exceed their authority, filling in
vague aspects of EC laws through dispute resolution, and deciding on charges of
noncompliance raised by the Commission or by member states. None of these roles
required national courts to funnel individual challenges to national policy to the ECJ
or to enforce EC law against their governments. Indeed, negotiators envisioned a
limited role for national courts in the EU legal system.
Id.at 124.
183.

Id. at 122.

184. Id. at 126; see also Tridimas, supra note 7, at 137 (noting that the transformation of "the
preliminary ruling system into a mechanism for the enforcement of EC law has conferred considerable
autonomy to the ECJ and freed it from being subservient to the national governments that set it up.").
185.

Garret, supra note 7.

186.

Wetzel, supranote 82, at 2833.

187.

Alter L supranote 127, at 122.
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discussed earlier, the enlistment of national courts, especially lower courts,
greatly assisted in the expansion of the ECJ's jurisdiction. 8 ' In addition to their
cooperation, various other factors influenced the acceptance of ECJ precedent
without arousing the suspicion and retaliation of Member States.8 9 These
factors include: 1) low profile decisions by the ECJ; 2) different timelines for
politicians and judges; 3) the difficulty of changing or amending the EC Treaty;
and 4) denying an ECJ ruling is like denying membership to the EU.' 90 While
this list is not exhaustive, it demonstrates some of the more important reasons
behind Member States accepting the ECJ's expansion ofjurisprudence. 9'
B. Low Profile Decisions
Some theorists speculate that "by limiting the material impact of its
decisions, the ECJ could minimize political focus on the Court and build
doctrine without provoking a political response, creating the opportunity for it
to escape [M]ember [S]tate oversight."' 92 Much like the judicial tactic used by
Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,93 the ECJ built powerful legal
doctrines by introducing the concept but not wielding its power.' 9 As

188.

See supra notes 162-180 and accompanying text (discussing the cooperation of national courts

in referring preliminary questions to the ECJ and applying their decisions as precedent); see also id. at 122
(discussing that with national courts sending cases to the ECJ and applying ECJ jurisprudence, interpretative
disputes were not easily kept out of the legal realm, and that national courts would not let politicians ignore

or cast aside as invalid unwanted decisions).
189.

See generally Alter I, supra note 127, at 129-35 (discussing how the ECJ escaped Members

States' control).
190.

See infra notes 200-205 and accompanying text.

191.

See generally Tridimas, supra note 7, at 137-38 (discussing the principle agent relationship as

another factor in how the ECJ grow powerful without Member States noticing).
Borrowing from the economic theory of the principle-agent relation the ECJ is seen as
an institution (agent) to which sovereign states (principals) have delegated authority
to interpret the law and thus facilitate transnational co-operation between the member
states. However, given the powers granted to accomplish its functions, the institution

may take a life of its own and serve its own interests by pursuing its most preferred
policies rather than those of the principals. In practice this takes the form of advancing
pro-integration policies that would not have been favored by some of the member state

governments.
Id.
192. Id. at 133. See also Garret,supra note 7, at 155 (stating that "[t]he best way for the Court to
further this agenda is through the gradual extension of case law (that is, the replacement of national laws and
practices by ECJ decisions as the law of the land in EU member states)."). Id.
193. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
194.

See Alter , supra note 127, at 131 relating that:
A common tactic is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that comes
before it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a general principle but suggest that it
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demonstrated in the Da Costa decision, "the ECJ declared the supremacy of EC
law.. . , but it found that Italian law privatizing the electric company did not
violate EC law."' 95 By laying the foundation of the EC legal system in an
incremental fashion, the ECJ was able to develop a foundation which challenged
the sovereignty of Member States, but did not arouse their suspicion until it was
too late.' 96
C. Different Time Lines for PoliticiansandJudges
The different time horizons for political and judicial careers also greatly
affected the Court's ability to cultivate legal principles. 97 Because the political
system is subject to a much shorter time frame, the national judiciaries are less
politically vulnerable. 98 "By making sure that ECJ decisions did not
compromise short-term political interests, the judges and the Commission could
build a legal edifice without serious political challenges."' 99 The material
impact of ECJ decisions mattered more to politicians than their doctrinal
significance."
D. To Deny an ECJ Decision is Like Denying Membership to the EU
In relation to the other EU institutions, the ECJ is considered perhaps the
most popular of the four institutions.2"' As a neutral third party enforcing the
is subject to various qualifications; the Court may even find some reason why it should
not be applied to the particular facts of the case. The principle, however, is now
established. If there are not too many protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the
qualifications can then be whittled away and the full extent of the doctrine revealed.
Id. (citing TREVOR C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMuNITY 78-79 (2nd ed. 1988)).
195.
196.

Alter I, supra note 126, at 131 (citing Tridimas, supra note 7).
See Lindseth, supra note 13, at 664 noting that:
Integration by adjudication was effective in part because it appealed to rule of law
sentiments among Member States officials, even where they were otherwise hostile to
specific decisions. It gave integration a distinctly incremental feel, not necessarily a
bad thing while the new regulatory regime was trying to legitimate itself.

Id.
197.

Alter L,supra note 127, at 142-43.

198.

Id.

199. Id. at 131.
200. See id. at 143 (stating that by taking advantage of the political fixation on the material
consequences of cases the ECJ was able to construct legal precedent without arousing political concern).
201. Interview with Anibal Sabater, supra note 158 ("If you have a conversation on the street with
Europeans about the EU, most will speak highly of the European Court of Justice. This is because the ECJ,
unlike the other Community institutions, represents a neutral third party willing to adjudicate interests on
behalf of individuals.").
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rights of private citizens created under the EC treaties, the ECJ is perceived as
an unbiased enforcer ofjustice. 202 "'No member has ever flatly rejected a Court
2 3
ruling: to do so would be tantamount to denial of membership of the EC.'
In addition, Member States who flout the authority of the ECJ face political
repercussions.0 4 Member States who do not abide by an ECJ ruling are
"single[d] out," perceived as "uncooperative," and are forced to face their
"domestic courts which apply the ECJ rulings."205
E. Difficulty in Reversing or Curtailingthe ECI's Power
After Member States realized the omnipotence of the ECJ's jurisdiction
under Article 234, it was too late to curtail its power. Overturning an ECJ
decision is very difficult. 2" It requires not only the passage of new legislation,
but cooperation among Member States.2 7 "[C]hanging the constitutional
provision or changing the role and the functions of the Court requires treaty
revision," something which can only be accomplished "by unanimity and
ratification by each [M]ember [S]tate.""2 ' The challenge of achieving unanimity
in overturning or revising an ECJ decision or power makes such action
impractical.
VI. CONCLUSION

With the signing of the EU Constitution in October of 2004,209 the EU is
moving towards the recognition of a supranational institution. The evolution of
the European Union requires the evolution of its legal system. Inherent to the
success of this process has been the ECJ's development of precedent through
the preliminary ruling system under Article 234.10
202.
203.

Id.
Swartz, supra note 11, at 694 (quoting Colchester & Buchan).

204.

Tridimas, supra note 7, at 138.

205.

Id.
206. See id. See also Alter L,supra note 127, at 135 (stating that "[t]he only choice left for politicians
is to rewrite the EU legislation itself.").
207. See Tridimas, supra note 7, at 138.
208. Id. (noting that "[t]he latter implies that the threat of revising the Court's mandate may lack
credibility and diminish its value"); see also Alter I, supra note 127, at 136. "In order to change the treaty,
[M]ember [S]tates need unanimous agreement plus ratification of the changed by all national parliaments.
Obtaining unanimous agreement about a new policy is hard enough. But creating a unanimous consensus to
change an existing policy is even more difficult." Id.
209. EU leaders sign new constitution, BBC NEWS,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/3963701.stm (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).

Oct.

29

2004,

210. See supra notes 55-80 and accompanying text (giving an overview of the ECJ's development
of a precedent based system).
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By engaging the support of national courts, private litigants, and creating
a body of case law, the ECJ propelled the EU's mission of economic
harmonization forward.2 ' With the duty to harmonize the laws of twenty-five
different nations, "the legitimation of precedent can ... be defended on the
ground that there was not, in reality, any other choice for the ECJ. 21 2
The ECJ's development of precedent represents the natural evolution of the
global legal system. 1 3 As argued by one scholar, "the first steps toward a global
legal culture will be dominated by some blending of civil law and common
law. 21 4 It is quite possible that the ECJ's development of precedent through
Article 234 represents "the tentative emergence of a common private law for the
' 21
European Community. 1

211.

Lindseth, supra note 13, at 663.

212.

CRAIG & DE BURCA, EU LAW, supranote 57, at 450.

See Miriam Aziz, Sovereignty Lost, Sovereignty Regained? Some Reflections on the
Bundesverfassungsgericht's Bananas Judgment, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 109,110 (2002) (stating that "the project
of European integration and sovereignty... at the micro-level represents an illustration of the effects of the
macro-level of globalization.").
213.

214.

Koch, supra note 94, at 3.

215.

Zimmermann, supra note 6, at 72.

